Robust Deep Reinforcement Learning through Adversarial Loss by Oikarinen, Tuomas et al.
Robust Deep Reinforcement Learning
through Adversarial Loss
Tuomas Oikarinen
MIT EECS
tuomas@mit.edu
Tsui-Wei Weng
MIT EECS
twweng@mit.edu
Luca Daniel
MIT EECS
luca@mit.edu
Abstract
Deep neural networks, including reinforcement learning agents, have been proven
vulnerable to small adversarial changes in the input, thus making deploying such
networks in the real world problematic. In this paper, we propose RADIAL-RL, a
method to train reinforcement learning agents with improved robustness against
any lp-bounded adversarial attack. By simply minimizing an upper bound of the
loss functions under worst case adversarial perturbation derived from efficient
robustness verification methods, we significantly improve robustness of RL-agents
trained on Atari-2600 games and show that RADIAL-RL can beat state-of-the-art
robust training algorithms when evaluated against PGD-attacks. We also propose a
new evaluation method, Greedy Worst-Case Reward (GWC), for measuring attack
agnostic robustness of RL agents. GWC can be evaluated efficiently and it serves
as a good estimate of the reward under the worst possible sequence of adversarial
attacks; in particular, GWC accounts for the importance of each action and their
temporal dependency, improving upon previous approaches that only evaluate
whether each single action can change under input perturbations. Our code is
available at https://github.com/tuomaso/radial_rl.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has achieved enormous success on a variety of challenging domains, ranging from
computer vision [1] and natural language processing [2] to reinforcement learning [3, 4]. Despite
this, recently questions have been raised about how reliable and robust these deep learning systems
really are. One concern is due to the existence of adversarial examples [5], where small and often
imperceptible perturbations can result in misclassifications of state-of-the-art deep neural networks
(DNNs). This indicates that current DNNs are not as robust and trust-worthy as we would expect,
and that there could be many problems if they are deployed in the real world without care.
Recently, adversarial attacks have also been shown possible for deep reinforcement learning (deep
RL) agents [6, 7, 8]. State-of-the-art agents may perform arbitrarily bad with significant drops in
the total accumulative reward due to adversarial perturbations in the observation space and/or action
space. As deep reinforcement learning agents are involved in many safety critical applications such
as self-driving cars and robotics, it is of crucial importance to develop robust training algorithms
(a.k.a. defense algorithms) such that the resulting trained agents are robust to adversarial (and
non-adversarial) perturbation.
There have been many publications on developing heuristic defenses to improve neural robustness
against adversarial attacks for image classification tasks, but they often fail against stronger adver-
sarial attack algorithms. [9] show that 13 such defense methods, recently proposed at prestigious
conferences, can all be broken by clever attacks. A possible emerging alternative direction is to
develop defense algorithms based on robustness verification bounds [10, 11, 12, 13], which produce
robustness certificates such that for any perturbations within the specified `p-norm distance , the
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trained network will produce consistent classification results on given data points. We don’t use the
naming convention in this field to call this type of defense as certified defense because we think it
is misleading as such defense methodology cannot provide any certificates on unseen data. Several
representative works include [11] and [14], where the authors show that by including the robustness
verification bounds in the loss function with proper training schedule, the learned models can have
much higher certified accuracies1, even if the verifier produces loose robustness certificate [14] for
models without robust training (a.k.a. nominal models).
However, there are much fewer defense algorithms designed for deep RL agents due to additional
challenges that are not present in classification tasks, such as lack of a stationary training set and
no clear correct action for each state. To bridge this gap, in this paper we present RADIAL(Robust
ADversarIAl Loss)-RL to overcome these challenges by utilizing robustness verification bounds in
a deep reinforcement learning setting. RADIAL can improve the robustness of deep RL agents by
carefully designing the adversarial loss functions with robustness verification bounds during training.
We summarize our contributions of this paper in the following:
• We propose a novel robust training framework for deep RL agents called RADIAL-RL,
which can be applied to different types of RL methods. We demonstrate RADIAL on
two popular RL algorithms, Deep Q-Networks (DQN) and Asynchronous Advantage Ac-
tor Critic (A3C) [15]. We use interval bound propagation [14] for our experiments for
training efficiency, but RADIAL can be used with other existing robustness verification
algorithms [11, 12, 16].
• We train and evaluate our RADIAL-DQN and RADIAL-A3C on the vision-based Atari-
2600 games and show that our robust policies outperforms the two recent works [17, 18]. In
particular, our RADIAL-DQN and RADIAL-A3C can still retain very high rewards even
when evaluated against 3× larger perturbations under PGD attacks.
• We also propose a new evaluation method, Greedy Worst-Case Reward (GWC), for effi-
ciently evaluating deep RL agent performance under attack of strongest adversaries (i.e.
worst-case perturbation). We show that GWC can be computed efficiently2 and that it is a
good estimate of the lower bound on worst-case reward.
2 Related Work and backgrounds
2.1 Adversarial attacks in Deep RL
Most of the research work studying adversarial examples has focused on supervised learning tasks,
especially classification. More recently, [6, 7, 8] showed that adversarial attacks are also an issue
for deep RL agents. There exists many types of perturbations, including adversarial perturbations
on agents’ observations/actions [6, 7, 8], mis-specification on the environment [19] and adversarial
disruptions on the agents [20]. In this paper, we focus on the threat model of `p-norm bounded
adversarial perturbations on agents’ observations.
2.2 Robustness verification and robust training for Deep RL
Previous work has applied adversarial training to defend against adversarial attacks [21, 22]; how-
ever, these approaches might not succeed against stronger adversaries and often have much higher
computational cost than standard training. Alternatively, robustness certification methods designed
for classifiers [12] have been utilized in deep RL setting. For example, [23] propose a policy of
choosing the action with highest certified lower bound Q-value during execution, and [24] derived
tighter robustness certificate for neural network policies under persistent adversarial perturbations in
the system. Nevertheless, these methods do not describe how to train more robust models.
The most relevant works related to our work are two very recent papers [17] and [18] that propose
robust training methods for deep Q-learning agents. [17] propose to train two neural networks, one
1The percentage of the test images that are guaranteed to be classified correctly under a given perturbation
magnitude 
2Lower bound on worst-case reward requires O(cT ) to compute, while GWC requires O(T ), where T is the
number of timesteps in an episode and c is the number of possible actions in a given state.
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with standard Q-learning and the other for imitating the first network, named as Robust Student-DQN
(RS-DQN). The main idea is to decouple the DQN agent into a policy-student network and the
other Q network is used to enable leveraging additional constraints on the student DQN without
strongly affecting learning of the correct Q-function. On the other hand, [18] propose adding a
hinge loss regularizer to Q-learning so that the DQN agents will tend to follow their original actions
when there are perturbations in the observation space. Their method relies on a more complex
robustness verification method which is around 5-10 times more expensive to calculate than IBP in
this setting. Although both of these approaches showed improvement on DQN robustness against
adversarial attacks, they focus on making sure the agent does not change its preferred action under
input perturbations. While this is a valid approach in many situations, it might cause problems in
some situations. For example in the case where  = 0 or close enough to zero that the output bounds
are tight, our loss function simply reduces to the standard DQN loss function, but SA-DQN loss
function will still have a regularization term that drives the difference between highest and second
highest Q-value to be at least a constant gap. This skews the learning in cases where the optimal
Q-values differ by less than gap, and drives Q-values for the current highest action too high, and the
Q-values for other actions too low. This may cause difficulties during learning and at evaluation if
some actions are randomized, as the network will learn a less flexible policy.
Experiments in Section 4.2 demonstrate our RADIAL-DQN and RADIAL-A3C can resist stronger
adversarial attacks when trained with the same , outperforming both the baselines [17, 18] in four
atari games (see Table 1). Additionally, as detailed in Sec 3.3, we propose a novel method to evaluate
agent performance against worst possible adversary, while [17, 18] lack a good metric for evaluating
certified robustness of RL agents and simply evaluate whether the DQN agents actions can change.
2.3 Basics of Reinforcment Learning (RL)
Environments used in this paper are discrete space MDPs, which can be described by the tuple
(S,A,P,R, γ, s0), where S is a set of discrete states, A is a discrete set of the available actions,
P : S × A× S → R defines the transition probabilities, and R : S × A → R is the scalar reward
function, s0 the initial state distribution and γ is the discount factor. RL algorithms aim at learning a
possibly stochastic policy pi : S ×A → R describing the probability of taking an action a given state
s. The goal of a policy is to maximize the cumulative time discounted reward of an episode
∑
t γ
trt,
where t is the timestep and rt, at and st are reward, action and state at timestep t.
Deep Q-networks. Deep Q-networks [3] (DQN) aim to learn a action-value function (Q) for each
state and action pair. The policy pi is taking the action with highest Q-value, with some chance of
taking a random action. The ideal Q-value for taking action a in state s, denoted as Q∗(s, a), is
defined as follows:
Q∗(s, a) = r + γE(s′|s,a)
[
max
a′
Q∗(s′, a′)
]
,
where s′ is the next state and r is reward. The central idea of deep Q-networks is to use neural
networks to approximate the ideal Q-value, and DQNs can be trained by minimizing the following
loss as a function of network parameters θ:
L(θ) = E(s,a,s′,r)
[
(r + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′; θ)−Q(s, a; θ))2
]
.
In line with previous works [17, 18] that use various improvements over vanilla DQN, we use
Double DQN [25] that improves on standard DQN by decoupling the Q-network used to evaluate the
target value (Qtarget with parameters θtarget) from the one being trained (Qactor with parameters
θactor). θtarget is typically updated by periodically copying over parameters of θactor, while θactor
is optimized by minimizing the following objective function:
L(θactor) = E(s,a,s′,r)
[
(r + γmax
a′
Qtarget(s
′, a′; θtarget)−Qactor(s, a; θactor))2
]
. (1)
Asynchronous Advantage Actor Critic. Asynchronous Advantage Actor critic (A3C), is a rein-
forcement learning algorithm which uses neural networks to learn a policy function pi(a|s; θ) and a
state-value function V (s; θv). Here the policy network determines which action to take, and value
function evaluates how good each state is. Typically the policy and value functions share the same
neural network architecture except the last layer. To update the network parameters, an estimate of
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the advantage function, A, is defined to compute how much better/worse than expected value function
V :
A(st, at; θ, θv) =
k−1∑
i=0
γirt+i + γ
kV (st+k; θv)− V (st; θv), (2)
where k is a hyperparameter. The network parameters (θ, θv) are learned by minimizing the following
loss function:
L(θ, θv) = E(st,at,rt)
[
(A(st, at; θ, θv))
2 − log pi(at|st; θ)A(st, at; θ, θv)− βH(pi(st; θ))
]
, (3)
where the first term optimizes the value function, second optimizes policy function and last term
encourages exploration by rewarding high entropy (H) of the policy, and β is a hyperparameter.
3 RADIAL-RL: a Robust Deep RL framework with adversarial loss
In this section, we propose RADIAL(Robust ADversarIAl Loss)-RL, a framework for training
deep RL agents robust against adversarial attacks. RADIAL designs adversarial loss functions by
leveraging existing robustness verification bounds of neural networks. We first introduce the key
idea of RADIAL and then demonstrate how to formulate the adversarial loss for the two popular
deep reinforcement learning algorithms, DQN and A3C in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. In Section 3.3, we
propose and motivate an alternative method called Greedy Worst-Case Reward (GWC) to efficiently
evaluate agent’s robustness against input perturbations.
Key idea. The adversarial loss function Ladv consists of two terms:
Ladv = κLstandard + (1− κ)Lwc, (4)
where Lstandard denotes the standard loss function (such as Equations (1) and (3) in the Section
2), Lwc accounts for the worst-case situation against the adversaries, and κ is a hyperparameter
controlling the trade-off between standard performance and robust performance with value between 0
and 1. Standard RL training algorithms have κ = 1 throughout the full training process, while in
RADIAL-RL, κ is a variable that depends on the training steps and one can design its schedule to
control the trade-off between nominal and robust performance at different training stages. For the
threat model where adversaries could perturb the original observation st within some `p-ball with
radius  at each timestep, we can calculate an upper bound of the perturbed standard loss, denoted
as Lwc, by using the certified bounds from neural network robustness verification algorithms such
as IBP [14], Fast-Lin [12] and many other robustness verification methods [13, 11, 26, 27, 28, 29].
Our approach is motivated by the idea that loss functions are designed to be lower for better policies,
so if we can keep loss low under adversarial perturbations, the policy should perform well under
adversarial perturbations.
Below we illustrate the key property of the robustness verification bounds of a given neural network:
Suppose zi(x) is the activation of the ith layer of a neural network with input x. The goal of a
robustness verification algorithm is to compute layer-wise lower and upper bounds of the neural
network, denoted as zi(x, ) and zi(x, ), such that zi(x, ) ≤ zi(x+ δ) ≤ zi(x, ), for any additive
input perturbation δ on x with ||δ||p ≤ . We can apply robustness verification algorithms on the
Q-networks (for DQN) or policy networks (for A3C) to get layer-wise output bounds of Q and pi, and
use these output bounds to calculate an upper bound of the original loss function under worst-case
adversarial perturbation Lwc. For the purpose of efficiency, we use IBP [14] to compute the layer-wise
bounds for the neural networks, but other differentiable certification methods [12, 13, 11, 26, 27, 28]
could be applied directly (albeit may incur additional computation cost). In addition, our experiments
focus on p =∞ to compare with baselines but the methodology works for general p.
3.1 RADIAL-DQN
For a DQN with K layers, the output bounds of the Q-value under -bounded perturbations to input s
are simply Q(s, a, ) = zK,a(s, ) and Q(s, a, ) = zK,a(s, ), which are used to define Lwc:
Lwc(θactor, ) = E(s,a,s′,r)
[∑
y
{
max(Bl, Bu) , if y = a
max(Cl, Cu) , otherwise
]
, (5)
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where we define B = r + γmaxa′ Qtarget(s′, a′) and
Bl = (B −Qactor(s, y, ))2, Bu = (B −Qactor(s, y, ))2,
Cl = (Qactor(s, y)−Qactor(s, y, ))2, Cu = (Qactor(s, y)−Qactor(s, y, ))2.
The B term is an upper bound of the original DQN loss function under adversarial perturbations, and
the C term was added to ensure the bounds on actions not taken will also be tight. This formulation
reduces to the original loss function Eq. (1) when  = 0.
3.2 RADIAL-A3C
In A3C, the value network V is only used to help with training and exploration, thus the approximated
advantage A(st, at; θ, θv) will still be defined by Equation (2) as the unperturbed form. Likewise
entropy H is only important for exploration during training, and we are not interested in whether
network entropy stays high under input perturbations and thus the unperturbed form of entropy term
is used. In other words, to obtain a robust A3C algorithm, we can focus on designing a robust policy
network pi. Here we define the corresponding Lwc as follows to make it an upper bound of the
original loss function (i.e. Equation (3)) under worst-case adversarial input perturbations:
Lwc(θ, θv) = E(st,at,rt)
[
(A(st, at; θ, θv))
2 −D − βH(pi(st; θ))
]
, (6)
where
D =
{
log(pi(at|st, ; θ))A(st, at; θ, θv) , if A(st, at; θ, θv) ≥ 0,
log(pi(at|st, ; θ))A(st, at; θ, θv) , otherwise.
Here pi(at) is the upper bound of the policy network pi at at-th output, which can be computed from
the upper bound of at-th logit and lower bound of other logits due to the softmax function at the last
layer. Note that Lwc is an upper bound of Lstandard and reduces to Lstandard if  = 0.
3.3 New efficient evaluation method: Greedy Worst-Case Reward
The goal of training RL agents robust against input perturbations is to ensure that the agents could still
perform well under any (bounded) adversarial perturbations. This can be translated into maximize
the worst-case reward Rwc, which is the lowest reward under worst possible sequence of adversarial
attacks. We define Rwc as follows:
Rwc = min||δt||p≤
Eτ [R(τ)], τ = (s0, a0, ..., sT , aT ), R =
∑
t
rt, (7)
where at ∼ pi(st + δt), st ∼ P(st−1, at−1), rt ∼ R(st−1, at−1). However Rwc is practically
impossible to evaluate – as finding the worst perturbations δt of a set of possible actions at for each
state st is NP-hard, and we will have to evaluate every possible trajectory τ to find which produces
the minimal reward. The amount of trajectories to evaluate grows exponentially with respect to
trajectory length T . One way to avoid finding worst-case perturbations directly is to use certified
output bounds [12, 13, 11, 26, 27, 28], which produces a superset of all possible actions under
worst-case perturbations and hence the resulting total accumulative reward is a lower bound of Rwc.
We name this reward as Absolute Worst-Case Reward (AWC) and the algorithm of computing AWC
is described in Algorithm 1. Note that AWC is a lower bound of Rwc when both the policy and
environment are deterministic.
However, AWC still requires evaluating an exponential amount of possible action sequences, which
is computationally expensive. To overcome this limitation, in this section, we propose an alternative
evaluation method called Greedy Worst-Case Reward (GWC), which approximates the desired Rwc
and can be computed efficiently with a linear complexity of total timesteps T . The idea of Greedy
Worst-Case Reward is to avoid evaluating exponential numbers of trajectories and use a simple
heuristic to approximate Rwc: choose the action with lowest Q-value (or the probability of action
taken for A3C) greedily at each state. The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. We show in
Figure 2 that Greedy Worst-Case Reward are often close to Absolute Worst-Case Reward while being
much faster to evaluate (linear complexity to total timesteps). In both algorithm descriptions, the
output pi will be the Q-values for the case of DQNs.
Note that previous evaluation methods do not directly measure reward. For example, [18] uses
the action certification rate and [17] uses the size of average provable region of no action change.
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Algorithm 1: Absolute Worst-Case Reward
Sopen = {(s0, 0)}
Rmin =∞
while Sopen 6= ∅ do
1. Pick a state and reward tuple (s′, R′) from Sopen and remove it from the set.
2. Calculate certified bounds on the output pii(s
′, ; θ) and pii(s′, ; θ) for each action i, as well as
the unperturbed output pii(s′, θ)
3. Calculate set of possible actions Γ := {i | pii ≥ maxj(pij)}
4. for action i in Γ do
Take action i, and observe new state s′′ and reward r′′.
if s′′ is terminal then
Update Rmin ← min(Rmin, R′ + r′′)
end
else
Add (s′′, R′ + r′′) to Sopen
end
end
end
return Rmin
Algorithm 2: Greedy Worst-Case Reward
R = 0
while st not terminal do
1. Calculate certified bounds on the output pii(st, ; θ) and pii(st, ; θ) for each action i, as well
as the unperturbed output pii(st, θ)
2. Calculate set of possible actions Γ := {i | pii ≥ maxj(pij)}
3. Take the "worst" action k out of the possible actions, k = argmini∈Γ(pii(st, θ)). Observe rt
and st+1 and update R← R+ rt
4. t = t+ 1
end
return R
These evaluation methods primarily focus on not changing agent’s original actions under adversarial
perturbations, which can be useful, since if most actions don’t change under attack, the reward is
also less likely to change. However, this is often not enough as attacks changing just one early action
could push the agent to an entirely different trajectory with very different results. As such, high action
certification rates may not follow reward received. For example, the action certification rate could be
very high (say 95%) meaning that most actions don’t change; however, if mostly the changed actions
(the other 5%) actually matter for the total reward, this would result in a high action certification
rate but low total reward under adversarial perturbation. In addition, actions not changing does not
say anything about the quality of the policy, so previous methods have to be reported together with
another measure such as nominal reward which makes comparison between models harder.
4 Results
4.1 Experimental setup
Environment, model architecture and simulation setup. We evaluate our algorithms on four
Atari-2600 games, Pong, Freeway, BankHeist and RoadRunner, on the Arcade Learning Environment
[30] to compare with previous works. These games have high dimensional pixel inputs and discrete
action spaces. For each game, we first train a standard agent without robust training, and then fine-tune
the model with RADIAL training. We found this training flow generally improve effectiveness of
training and enable the agents to reach high nominal rewards. For both DQN and A3C, we used the
same architecture in [31]. See Appendix B for training details including hyperparameters and their
selection procedure. Unlike [18], we aimed to use one set of hyperparameters for all games.
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Game Model\Metric Nominal PGD attack GWC reward
 0 1/255 3/255 1/255
Baselines:
RS-DQN ([17]) 19.73 18.13 N/A N/A
DQN ([18]) 20.7±0.5 -21.0±0.0 N/A N/A
Pong SA-DQN([18]) 21.0±0.0 20.1±0.0 N/A N/A
Our methods:
DQN 20.55±0.11 -21.0±0.0 -21.0±0.0 -21.0±0.0
RADIAL-DQN 20.85±0.08 20.8±0.09 20.8±0.09 -1.85±4.62
A3C 21.0±0.0 -20.6±0.18 -21.0±0.0 -21.0±0.0
RADIAL-A3C 20.0±0.0 20.0±0.0 20.0±0.0 20.0±0.0
Baselines:
RS-DQN ([17]) 32.93 32.53 N/A N/A
DQN([18]) 32.9±0.7 0.0±0.0 N/A N/A
Freeway SA-DQN([18]) 30.78±0.5 30.36±0.7 N/A N/A
Our methods:
DQN 21.4 ± 0.27 22.1±0.33 21.25±0.31 0.0±0.0
RADIAL-DQN 21.75±0.35 21.95±0.40 21.55±0.26 21.7±0.39
Baselines:
RS-DQN ([17]) 238.66 190.67 N/A N/A
DQN([18]) 1308.4±24.1 56.4±21.2 N/A N/A
SA-DQN([18]) 1041.4±12.3 1043.6±9.5 N/A N/A
BankHeist Our methods:
DQN 641.0±31.6 0.0±0.0 1.0±0.7 0.0±0.0
RADIAL-DQN 1033.5 ± 23.0 1038.0±23.0 833.5±45.2 1048.0±32.3
A3C 1099.0±22.2 197.5±15.5 16.5±2.5 0.0±0.0
RADIAL-A3C 852.±7.3 848.0±3.8 827.0±6.0 832.5±4.1
Baselines:
RS-DQN([17]) 12106.67 5753.33 N/A N/A
DQN([18]) 36946±6089 0.0±0.0 N/A N/A
SA-DQN([18]) 15172 ± 792 15280±828 N/A N/A
RoadRunner Our methods:
DQN 38635±1489 0.0±0.0 0.0±0.0 0.0±0.0
RADIAL-DQN 41720±3289 43920±1238 12480±901 33745±2389
A3C 36670±1313 4930±710 1305±206 0.0±0.0
RADIAL-A3C 28975±1369 30435±1504 30620±1141 29595±1428
Table 1: Result comparison. For our models we have reported mean reward of 20 episodes, as well
as standard error of the mean. All models are trained using  = 1/255. A3C did not learn Freeway,
which was omitted from the table.
RADIAL-DQN. We first train a standard DQN for 6 M steps followed by 4.5 M steps of RADIAL
training. For RADIAL-DQN training, we first decreased κ linearly from 1 to 0.5 for 3 M steps, then
increased  linearly from 0 to 1/255, finally kept κ = 0.5 and  = 1/255 for the last 1.5 M steps.
RADIAL-A3C. We first train A3C models for 20M steps with standard training followed by 10M
steps of RADIAL-A3C training. This has a similar computational cost as our DQN training. A3C
takes actions stochastically during training but during evaluation we set it to choose the action that
would have the highest probability. For RADIAL-A3C training,  was first linearly increased from 0
to 1/255 over the first 2/3 of the training steps and kept at 1/255 for the rest. We found that when
κ = 0.5 from the start instead of slowly increase can significantly improve the performance of A3C.
Evaluation. We use the following methods to evaluate the performance of our agents: (a) the reward
achieved under l∞-bounded adversarial attacks applied on every frame and (b) Greedy Worst-Case
Reward . For (a), we used an untargeted version of two popular white-box attack strategies, Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [32] and 30-step Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [33], which is
stronger than 4 or 10 step attacks used by previous works. For (b), each trained model was evaluated
for 20 episodes with different random starts against each method.
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(a) PGD attack (b) Greedy Worst-Case
Figure 1: Robustness comparison over large range of perturbation sizes of agents trained on Pong.
Lines are the mean reward over 20 episodes and shaded area is the range of rewards. This shows
the magnitude of robustness improvement, with bigger improvements against stronger evaluation
methods. Note that Greedy Worst-Case Reward starts low for very small  because IBP-bounds are
loose for standard networks.
Figure 2: The means over 20 runs of RA-
DIAL-A3C evaluated on Pong games up to
1 point on different perturbation sizes. GWC
is the percentage of +1 rewards measured by
Greedy Worst-Case Reward , while AWC is
the percentage of +1 rewards using absolute
worst-case calculation.
4.2 RADIAL-RL results
Table 1 shows that RADIAL-DQN significantly outperforms the baseline [18] on RoadRunner and
Pong against  = 1/255 PGD-attack, and matches their results on BankHeist. It is hard to evaluate
which part of these improvements come from our robust training compared to other details of the
training process. This is due to the complexity of RL training, and lack of published code by previous
works at the time of writing. However, we can see that our standard Q-network performs equally well
with that of [18] on Pong and RoadRunner while being significantly worse than theirs on BankHeist
and Freeway. Despite this, RADIAL-DQN is able to match SA-DQN performance after robust
training on BankHeist, and outperform it on Pong and RoadRunner. This gives us confidence in our
robust training process as source of improvements. Additionally, we show RADIAL-DQN loses very
little performance when evaluated against PGD-attacks with  = 3/255, which is 3× larger than any
previous work was evaluated on, despite being only trained against 1/255 attacks.
For RADIAL-A3C, it is able to achieve very high rewards and robustness on 3/4 tasks despite these
tasks being likely chosen by previous work because they are easy to learn for Q-learning agents. This
is most clear for Freeway which A3C fails to learn, because the optimal policy consists of moving
up a very large majority of the time, which is much more easier to be discovered by an agent doing
-greedy exploration. In Table 1 we see that RADIAL-A3C reaches slightly lower nominal rewards
than RADIAL-DQN but shows superior performance in robustness. Meanwhile, its performance
doesn’t drop in any of the games even when evaluated under PGD-attacks with  = 3/255 or GWC
with  = 1/255.
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4.3 Evaluating GWC
With the goal to increase Rwc, there are many approaches to perform robust training. For example,
adversarial training focuses on increasing performance against a specific attack which is an upper
bound of Rwc. On the other hand, defenses based on certified output bounds such as our proposed
RADIAL and [18, 17] are suitable for increasing the lower bound of Rwc. Since Greedy Worst-
Case Reward is aimed for evaluating methods of the latter group, it is important that GWC closely
approximates the lower bound AWC, which is indeed the case as shown below.
In Figure 2 we compare GWC and action certification rate (ACR) against the Absolute Worst-Case
Reward (AWC, Algorithm 1). Due to the exponential complexity of AWC, we conduct small scale
experiments on single point games of Pong and implement AWC using depth first search (DFS). The
implementation details are in Appendix B. The DFS searches were terminated after going through
more than 5000 action sequences to save time and avoid infinite loops, and only episodes where
the search finished are included in the graph. Out of the perturbations shown on the plot, only 6/20
episodes with  = 1.2 terminated within this time limit, but for all other values of  every episode
terminated.
For the episodes that we evaluated, Greedy Worst-Case Reward matched AWC perfectly every time.
The mean of action certification rate also followed AWC relatively closely, but not for individual
episodes. For example, at  = 1.15, 14/20 evaluation runs resulted in AWC of +1, and the average
action certification rate for these was 0.873. The other 6/20 evaluation runs resulted in AWC of -1,
and the average action certification rate of these was 0.938, so ACR had a negative correlation with
AWC on these episodes. We acknowledge that this is a small sample size and it is likely that for the
cases where absolute worst case did not terminate GWC and AWC would differ more often. Despite
that, this experiment and our theoretical justifications in section 3.3 suggests that GWC is a better
metric than action certification rate.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that using the proposed adversarial loss in our RADIAL framework can significantly
improve the robustness of reinforcement learning agents against adversarial perturbations. We showed
the robustly trained agents reach very good performance on Atari games under perturbations even 3
times larger than previous state of the art. In addition, we have presented a new evaluation method,
Greedy Worst-Case Reward, to better evaluate reinforcement learning agent performance under
adversarial input perturbations. Our proposed Greedy Worst-Case Reward is a good surrogate of the
worst-case reward and can be computed much more efficiently. Together these contributions take us
closer to safe and reliable reinforcement learning agents.
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Appendix A: extra figures
Pong
(a) A3C (b) Robust A3C
(c) DQN (d) Robust DQN
Figure 3: Our models evaluated on a large range of epsilons and different metrics. Note that GWC is
stronger than PGD which is stronger than FGSM
Freeway
(a) DQN (b) Robust A3C
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BankHeist
(a) A3C (b) Robust A3C
(c) DQN (d) Robust DQN
(e) PGD comparison (f) GWC comparison
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RoadRunner
(a) A3C (b) Robust A3C
(c) DQN (d) Robust DQN
(e) PGD comparison (f) GWC comparison
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Appendix B: Experimental setup details
Neural net architechture The neural net architecture used starts with a convolutional layer with
8x8 kernel, stride of 4 and 32 channels, second a convolutional layer with 4x4 kernel, stride of 2 and
64 channels, and a third convolutional layer with 3x3 kernel, stride of 1 and 64 channels, and last a
fully connected layer with 512 units, with each layer except for last followed by a ReLU nonlinearity.
Final layer had the outputs, with a Softmax activation for the policy output of A3C, while the A3C
value output V or DQN output didn’t have an activation function.
Environment details All our models take an action or step every 4 frames, skipping the other
frames. The network inputs were 80x80x1 crops of the greyscaled pixels with no framestacking,
scaled to be between 0-1. All rewards were clipped between [-1, 1].
Computing infrastructure and time All our models were trained on a Google Cloud instance
with 2 NVIDIA Tesla T4 GPUs and 16 vCPUs. For DQN we typically were training 4 models in
parallel, in which setting standard training took 13 hours and robust training took an additional 12
hours. For A3C we only trained one model at a time, which took around 3.5h for standard training
and another 4 hours for robust training.
DQN-hyperparameters For all DQN models we used an Adam optimizer [34] with learning rate
of 1.25 · 10−4 and β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999. We used Double DQN with a replay buffer of 2 · 105, exp
for -greedy exploration was linearly decreased from 1 to 0.01 over the first 5 · 105 frames of standard
training and kept at 0.01 for the rest of standard training and for robust training. The neural network
was updated with a batch-size of 128 after every 8 steps taken, and the target network was updated
every 2000 steps taken.
The hyperparameters we searched over include learning rate chosen from {6.25·10−5, 1.25·10−4, 2.5·
10−4, 5 · 10−4}, exp-end from {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1}, exp-decay length from {2 · 105, 5 · 105, 1 ·
106, 2 · 106}, batch size from {32, 64, 128, 256} and whether to use Amsgrad[35] optimizer or
standard Adam, and and were chosen based on what performed best on standard Pong training and
kept the same for other tasks, with the exception of using we used the Amsgrad variant for robust
training on Pong since Adam training with the same parameters was found to be unstable.
A3C hyperparameters A3C models were trained using all 16 cpu workers and 2 GPUs for gradient
updates. We used Amsgrad optimizer at a learning rate of 0.0001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 for all
A3C models. Our β controlling entropy regularization was set to 0.01, and k in Equation (2) to
20. To optimize we chose the best learning rate from {5 · 10−5, 1 · 10−4, 2 · 10−4} and κ from
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75} based on performance on Pong standard and robust training respectively.
Absolute worst case reward evaluation We ran experiments on Atari Pong games up to 1(We
evaluated the second point of each episode since our networks perform less consistently on the first
point) instead of standard 21 to reduce episode length n, and used our RADIAL-A3C because it’s
high robustness helps us reduce the amount of possible actions c. Absolute worst case reward was
calculated using depth first search on the state space, where finding a sequence of actions that leads to
-1 reward is enough to end the search, because that is the worst possible reward, but to say absolute
worst case reward is 1 we have to search every possible sequence of actions.
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